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Technological advancements in the last twenty years have substantially altered the 
ways in which people work, communicate, and are entertained. Many of these 
advancements have occurred in areas generally thought to fall under the regulatory 
purview of the Federal Communications Commission (FCC). These advancements have 
included the personal computer, the internet, digital cable, direct broadcast satellites 
(DBS), and cellular phones. Of all these increasingly available and inexpensive 
technologies, perhaps the most ubiquitous is the cellular phone.1 Thus far, the FCC has 
struggled to apply its public interest mandate to the ever shifting sands of technological 
development with varying degrees of success.2 Cellular phone regulation however has 
proven relatively simple and free from first amendment challenges as it has mostly 
included simple interconnectivity regulation, and the monitoring of the cell phone’s 
impact on competition. The era of straightforward cellular regulation may soon be 
coming to an end as the cellular industry continues its transition to broadband speeds, and 
richer content.  
 Over the course of 2005 and continuing through 2006 the major cellular operators 
have begun upgrading their systems to new third generation (3G) technology.3 This 
technology allows for connection speeds far exceeding the older second generation 
networks. These speeds have permitted the development of new video services such as 
 
1 Kim, Ryan. “The world's a cell-phone stage: The device is upending social rules and creating a new 
culture.” San Francisco Chronicle, 02/27/06 pg C-1 
2 U.S. v. Playboy Entertainment Group, 529 U.S. 803 (2003); Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844 (1997);  FCC v. 
Pacifica, 438 U.S. 726 (1978). 
3 http://www.betanews.com/article/TMobile_Plans_for_Growth_3G_in_2006/1134755975 (Last visited 
4/29/06). This article discusses the upcoming launch of T-Mobile’s 3G service 
3Cingular Wireless’s CV service, or Verizon’s V-Cast. The scheduled advanced wireless 
services (AWS) auction on June 29, 2006 is likely to only speed the development of these 
new faster networks.4
A transition to 3G cellular service will mean that cellular phones will have ceased 
being mere communication devices and will have taken on many of the characteristics of 
the richer content technologies like cable, the internet, and DBS. The sheer pervasiveness 
of cellular phones - they appear in restaurants, on public streets, in movie theatres, and in 
every other imaginable locale - means that there will almost certainly be a call to 
Congress and the FCC to regulate the content of the video delivered. What form is FCC 
regulation of 3G cellular content likely to take? What rationales are likely to be advanced 
for these regulations? Firstly, to answer these questions, it is necessary to look at what 
form content regulation has taken in other technological contexts, and at the rationales 
offered to support those regulations. Secondly, it is necessary to speculate as to the shape 
that 3G technologies are likely to take so that they can be properly analogized to 
established regulated technologies. The scope of this paper does not include a discussion 
of whether the rationales for content regulation are logical or a discussion about the 
Constitutional validity of content regulation. An analysis of the Constitutional validity of 
each of the possible regulatory approaches is, at a minimum, owed its own paper. Rather, 
this paper focuses on a proposed regulatory regime for 3G cellular content.         
 
II. CURRENT REGULATION 
 
A. Broadcast Encouraged Content 
 
4 Id.
4The FCC was the successor regulatory body to the Federal Radio Commission. As 
the name implies the Federal Radio Commission was formed in 1927 to regulate the radio 
spectrum.5 The FCC replaced the Federal Radio Commission in 1934 and was given a 
mandate to regulate not only the radio spectrum, but also telephony. As other non-radio 
uses developed for the electromagnetic spectrum, the territory of the FCC was gradually 
expanded to cover those uses. The advent of the television occasioned just such an 
expansion, and the regulation of television was subsumed under the FCC’s authority to 
regulate radio as a different medium of broadcast. Therefore, the early foundational cases 
regarding the regulation of broadcast content were in the context of radio broadcasts, but 
have been equally extended to video broadcasts.  
 One of the earliest attempts at content regulation of broadcast by the FCC was the 
fairness doctrine.6 The fairness doctrine was made up of two parts. First, the doctrine 
stated that if a broadcaster attacked a person or group while discussing a controversial 
issue, that broadcaster had to inform the target group within one week, and had to allow 
them to respond. Second, the fairness doctrine stated that whenever a broadcaster made a 
political editorial, that broadcaster had to notify opposing political candidates, and had to 
allow them the opportunity to retort.7 The broadcaster was required to allow the 
proponents of those viewpoints time to express their ideas, and had to do so free of 
charge if the proponents of the differing views could not afford to pay for their 
 
5 Benjamin, Stuart M; Lichtman, Douglas G; Shelanski, Howard A. Telecommunications Law and Policy.
Carolina Academic Press, Durham, NC. 2001. pg 16.  
6 Red Lion Broadcasting v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 369-371 (1969). 
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5broadcast.8 The original justification behind the fairness doctrine was the FCC’s mandate 
under 47 U.S.C. §303 to act as “public convenience, interest, and necessity requires.” The 
Supreme Court determined that Congress’ use of the phrase public interest “imposed a 
duty on broadcasters to discuss both sides of controversial issues.”9
In Red Lion, the Supreme Court addressed a first amendment challenge to the 
fairness doctrine. A broadcaster had accused the author of a book of working for a 
communist newspaper, of defending Alger Hiss, and of attacking J. Edgar Hoover. The 
author requested an opportunity to respond under the fairness doctrine and was denied. 
The author then brought suit to force the broadcasters to give him access.  The Supreme 
Court in Red Lion established two principles which have continued to substantially 
impact telecommunications regulation. First, the Court held that “differences in the 
characteristics of new media justify differences in the First Amendment standards applied 
to them.”10 Second, the court established the scarcity rationale for allowing some content-
based regulation of broadcast.11 
The scarcity rationale posits that because there are more speakers who desire to use 
radio spectrum than can use it, and because the government must license some of those 
people to have rights to the spectrum, the government may require licensees to allow 
access to other people in the hopes of encouraging more diverse speech.12 Therefore, it is 
the government’s interest in creating a better informed public despite the limits of scarce 
radio spectrum which permits the abridgement of some of the First Amendment rights of 
broadcasters.  As the Court in Red Lion stated, “It is the right of the viewers and listeners, 
 
8 Id.
9 Id. at 380. 
10 Id. at 386 
11 Id.
12 Id at 390 
6not the right of the broadcasters which is paramount.”13 Following this rationale to its 
conclusion, the Court held that the fairness doctrine was consistent with the First 
Amendment.14 
In 1987 the FCC re-evaluated the fairness doctrine and chose to eliminate it.15 The 
FCC determined that the fairness doctrine actually undermined the quality of information 
in the broadcast media, because broadcasters simply ceased covering controversial issues, 
and ceased taking opinionated stances.16 Thus, the purpose of the fairness doctrine was 
no longer being met and the doctrine had become merely a hindrance to free speech. The 
FCC also determined that technological changes including the introduction of cable and 
satellite television had rendered the scarcity rationale obsolete.17 The FCC’s decision to 
eliminate the fairness doctrine was reviewed in Syracuse Peace Counsel v. FCC.18 The 
court in Syracuse upheld the FCC’s decision, but specifically declined to rule on the 
continuing validity of the scarcity rational, or on the First Amendment issues.  Rather, the 
court simply found that the doctrine was no longer accomplishing its objective. More 
recently, the Supreme Court and the FCC have continued their reliance on the scarcity 
rationale, and on the principles established in Red Lion.
While the fairness doctrine is no longer in place, a similar doctrine still remains.19 
This doctrine states that whenever a broadcaster sells time to a political candidate, the 
broadcaster must sell similarly valuable time at the same rate to opposing political 
 
13 Id.
14 Id. at 401 
15 In Re Complaint of Syracuse Peace Council, 2 FCC Rcd. 5043 (1987).  
16 Id. at P 59 
17 Id. at PP 64,65 
18 Syracuse Peace Counsel v. FCC, 867 F.2d 654 (D.C. cir. 1989). 
19 47 USC §315. 
7candidates. This requirement excludes broadcast exposure of a candidate as the result of 
bona fide news reporting. 
 Another form of content regulation that encourages specific content in broadcast 
are the children’s educational programming guidelines. In 1990, Congress passed the 
Children’s Television Act (CTA) to encourage broadcasters as part of their public interest 
obligation to produce and air children’s educational programming.20 In formulating the 
specific rules for implementing the CTA, the FCC created four criteria that must be met 
for something to be defined as children’s programming; (1) the programming must have 
serving the educational and informational needs of children as a significant purpose, (2) 
the programming must be regularly scheduled, (3) the programming must be at least 
thirty minutes long, and (4) the programming must air between 7:00 am and 10:00 pm.21 
In order for a broadcaster to meet their public interest obligations, they must air a 
minimum of three hours of material that meets the above criteria.22 If a broadcaster airs 
three hours of core children’s programming, then they get a check next to the children’s 
educational programming box on their license renewal application. If a broadcaster does 
not air three hours of programming, they will be referred to the commission for further 
investigation.23 This processing guideline operates as a strong incentive for broadcasters 
to comply with the CTA.  
 Congress had several reasons for passing the CTA. First, Congress believes that 
children’s educational programming has the potential to provide educational and social 
 
20 Policies and Rules Concerning Children’s Television Programming, 11 FCC Rcd. 10660 (1996). 
21 Id. at P 4. 
22 Id. at P 5 
23 Id. at P 6 
8benefits to the children who watch it.24 Second, Congress believes that lower income 
children are likely to benefit from children’s educational programming disproportionately 
to upper income children.25 Lastly, Congress believes that market pressures prevent the 
socially optimal amount of children’s programming from being aired. (TB 266-267). 
Thus, because broadcast is uniquely accessible to lower income families, and because 
children’s educational programming has positive social effects which the market doesn’t 
account for, Congress chose to impose the CTA on broadcasters as part of their public 
interest obligations.  
 The market pressures preventing the socially optimal amount of children’s 
programming from being aired are intimately tied to the advertiser-paid nature of free 
broadcast.26 As a general rule, the larger the viewing audience, the more money an 
advertiser is willing to pay for a given amount of time. Adults aged 18-49 account for 
122.2 million potential viewers, whereas children only account for 59.5 million.27 
Moreover, children’s educational programming must be targeted at small subsets of the 
young audience, as a program designed for 7 year old children is not likely to appeal to or 
educate 12 year old children.28 This slicing up of the audience makes the airing of 
children’s programs less profitable for broadcasters. Additionally, children, particularly 
the youngest, don’t have independent purchasing power. Advertisers recognize this and 
factor this consideration into the amount they are willing to pay for ads during children’s 
educational programming.29 
24 Id. at P 9-12 
25 Id.
26 Id. at P 29-30 
27 Id. at P 31 
28 Id.
29 Id. at P 33 
9When looking at whether political or children’s educational content should be 
promoted through regulation on 3G cellular technology, it will be necessary to keep in 
mind the particular nature of broadcast. This nature includes its universality, its public 
interest obligations, its exclusively advertiser supported content, its unique educational 
ability, and its scarcity.  
 
B. Broadcast Discouraged Content 
 
Discouraged content in broadcast falls into two not totally distinct categories. 
These categories are indecent material, and material which may fall short of indecency, 
but which parents may not want their children being exposed to, including violent 
content. According to the FCC, indecent content is content that “in context, depicts or 
describes, in terms patently offensive as measured by contemporary community standards 
for the broadcast medium, sexual or excretory organs or activities.”30 This content as well 
as profane speech is tightly regulated by the FCC in the context of broadcast. 
 The broadcast of indecent material is limited by section 16(a) of the 1992 
Telecommunications Act.31 The D.C. Circuit in Action held that 16(a) could limit 
indecent broadcasts to the hours between 10:00 pm and 6:00 am.32 The court in Action 
analyzed the constitutionality of the restriction and determined that the government had a 
compelling interest in limiting indecency, and that the time channeling provision was 
narrowly tailored to achieve that goal.33 
30 http://www.fcc.gov/cgb/consumerfacts/obscene.html (Last visited 04/29/06). 
31 Action for Children’s Television v. FCC, 58 F.3d 654 (D.C. Cir. 1995). 
32 Id. at 669-670 
33 Id.
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In Action, the court determined that the compelling government interest was two 
fold. First, the government has a compelling interest in protecting children from being 
exposed to indecency by anyone other than their parents.34 Second, the government has a 
compelling interest in assisting parents to control their children’s access to indecent 
material.35 The court opined that the broadcast medium was particularly suited to the time 
channeling restriction, because of the pervasiveness of the medium. By pervasive, the 
court meant both that broadcast signals enter the home whether or not an individual 
chooses to receive them, and that there are so many means of receiving broadcast signals 
within the typical American home that it is very difficult for a parent to control their 
children’s access to it with any consistency.36 The court noted that many children have 
their own television, and that many children have headphones for their radio.37 By 
restricting indecent broadcasts to times when parents are likely to be home and able to 
directly supervise their children, and to times when younger children are likely not to be 
part of the viewing audience, the time channeling restrictions are able to address both of 
the compelling interests of the government. 
 Congress has also acted to support parental control over their children’s access to 
material which while not necessarily indecent may have content that their parents would 
prefer them not to be exposed to, particularly violent content.38 The 1996 
Telecommunications act §551 known as Parental Choice in Television Programming, 
stated that unless broadcasters adopted ‘voluntary rules for rating video programming 
 
34 Id. at 660-661 
35 Id.
36 Id. at 659-660 
37 Id. at 661 
38 Benjamin, Stuart M; Lichtman, Douglas G; Shelanski, Howard A. Telecommunications Law and Policy.
Carolina Academic Press, Durham, NC. 2001. pg 240. 
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that contains sexual, violent, or other indecent material’, and unless broadcasters 
broadcast that rating information along with the television program, the FCC will be 
empowered to appoint an advisory committee to establish a ratings regime, and will then 
impose that regime through regulations.39 In addition to these requirements, §551 also 
imposed on T.V. manufacturers a requirement that they place a ‘v-chip’ into every 
television set over 13” that they produce.40 This chip, susceptible to parental control, has 
the ability to read the broadcasted ratings, and to block out programs which do not meet 
the pre-approved limits set by parents. 
 The rationale offered to support the threatened regulation in §551 is probably very 
similar to the rationale offered to support the time channeling of indecent material. §551 
applies to indecent material as well as violent content, and directly provides parents with 
a means to filter the content available to their children, whether or not they are home to 
personally supervise what their children are viewing. §551 is also interesting because it is 
an example of regulation achieved without official regulation. Had the FCC acted to 
impose regulations, it is not clear if they would have been found to be constitutional.41 In 
the context of 3G cellular technology, it is possible that Congress would employ a similar 
tactic to avoid the constitutional challenges.  
 In considering the possible regulation of indecent content over 3G networks, we 
should consider the rationales offered to regulate that content over broadcast. These 
rationales included the pervasiveness of the broadcast signal, the parental interest in 
controlling the content available to their children, and the government’s interest in 
limiting children’s exposure to indecent or violent content.   
 




C. Cable Encouraged Content 
 
Congress and the FCC have acted to promote diverse content on cable.42 Under 47 
U.S.C. §531(b), local cable franchising authorities may require that a cable company 
provide channel capacity for public, educational, or governmental use.43 This requirement 
is know as the PEG provision. The PEG provision was challenged in Time Warner v. 
FCC, but the court determined that it was content neutral.44 According to the court, the 
PEG requirement applied to all cable operators equally, and did not punish or reward any 
cable operators based on content.45 The finding of content neutrality was critical in the 
upholding of the PEG regulations, because the courts have determined that cable does not 
merely receive the same cursory first amendment protection that broadcast receives, but 
receives first amendment protections more akin to the printed media.46 As the court in 
TBS observed, the scarcity rationale which applies in broadcast regulation does not apply 
to the cable context.47 The cable platform has the ability to carry many more channels 
than does the broadcast platform, and unlike broadcast where the government was in the 
business of handing out licenses for spectrum, cable companies transmit content along a 
physical line that they control. 
 The rationale for imposing the PEG requirement on cable companies is likely 
related to the goal of exposing the public to diverse viewpoints, and of increasing the 
 
42 Time Warner v. FCC, 93 F.3d 963 (D.C. Cir. 1996). 
43 Id.
44 Id. at 971 
45 Id.
46 Turner Broadcasting System v. FCC, 512 U.S. 637 (1994). 
47 Id.
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amount of educational programming on T.V..  When discussing the must-carry cable 
provisions which require cable companies to carry local broadcast stations, the court in 
Turner noted that “the widest possible dissemination of information from diverse and 
antagonistic sources is essential to the welfare of the public.”48 Thus, the PEG 
requirements ensure that a portion of the cable medium is available for these diverse and 
potentially antagonistic sources. Moreover, the PEG provisions allow for local 
programming which has always been one of the policy goals of the FCC.49 
D. Cable Discouraged Content 
 
Congress has made several attempts to limit the availability of indecent content 
over cable lines.50 §§ 504 & 505 of the Telecommunications Act of 1996 both sought to 
limit access to cable channels which are primarily dedicated to showing “sexually explicit 
adult programming, or other programming that is indecent.”51 §505 required the operators 
of these channels to either ensure that the channels would be completely blocked at the 
point of receipt, and would not allow signal bleed, or to time channel their indecent 
programming.52 Prior to the legislation, the channels were already blocking people from 
receiving the signals who were not ordering the program, but the scrambling was not 
complete.53 The court in Playboy found §505 to be overly restrictive in large part because 
 
48 Id. at 653-654. 
49 2002 Biennial Regulatory Review of the Commissions Broadcast Ownership Rules. P 73 
50 U.S. v. Playboy Entertainment Group, 529 U.S. 803 (2000).  
51 Id. at 811. 
52 Id. at 806. 
53 Id.
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there was little evidence that signal bleed was a substantial problem.54 Therefore, the 
Playboy court struck down §505.55 
§504 of the Telecommunications Act of 1996 addressed the signal bleed issue in a 
less restrictive manner. §504 required providers of sexually explicit content to install a 
blocking device on the cable box of anyone who actively requested the ability to block 
the sexually explicit channels.56 This blocking device does not suffer from the same 
potential problems as the standard signal scrambling technique. The Playboy court found 
this lesser restriction on speech to be acceptable.57 
The rationale for limiting indecency on cable is almost identical to the rationale for 
limiting indecency over broadcast.58 The court in Denver found that cable television is at 
least as accessible to children as broadcast television, that cable television is as pervasive 
as broadcast television, and that the same difficulties in preventing children from being 
exposed to indecent material are present.59 While the same rationales might be used to 
justify regulation of indecency in broadcast and cable, those justifications provide for less 
regulation in the cable context. This difference appears to be based on the scarcity 
rational, and the Red Lion court’s statement that different technologies should be subject 
to different treatment.         
 The rationales offered to support regulation of cable content are very similar to the 
rationales offered to support regulation of broadcast content. The differences in the 
allowable scope of the regulation can be largely attributed to the differences in the 
 
54 Id. at 818. 
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57 Id. at 827.  
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technologies. Thus when analyzing how 3G might be regulated, it is not only the various 
rationales for regulation which must be considered, but it is also the form that 3G 
technology is likely to take that must be considered. 
 
E. Satellite Encouraged Content 
 
Congress has also imposed regulations on the content provided by DBS. Section 25 
of the 1992 Cable Act as codified by 47 U.S.C. §335(b)(1) provides that DBS operators 
are required to reserve a minimum of 4% of their channel capacity exclusively for non-
commercial programming of an educational or informational nature. In addition to this 
requirement, DBS providers are not allowed to exercise editorial discretion over that 4% 
of their channel capacity.  
 In Time Warner, §335(b)(1) was challenged as being a restriction on First 
Amendment speech. The court in Time Warner determined that DBS is similar to 
broadcasting, and that it should be subjected to the same lesser scrutiny as outlined by the 
decision in Red Lion.60 In determining that DBS is like broadcast, the court in Time 
Warner considered that there are a limited number of satellite positions available for DBS 
service, and that the demand for DBS licenses far exceeds the available supply.61 Having 
determined that regulation of DBS receives lighter scrutiny, the court in Time Warner 
reviewed the government’s rationale for §335(b)(1). The court found that the rationale 
behind §335(b)(1) was to encourage diversity of information sources, and that “assuring 
that the public has access to a multiplicity of informational sources is a governmental 
 
60 Time Warner Entertainment v. FCC, 93 F.3d 975 (D.C. Cir. 1996).  
61 Id. 
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purpose of the highest order, for it promotes values central to the First Amendment.”62 
The Time Warner court held that where DBS regulation is subject to a lower level of 
scrutiny, and that where the government has a strong rationale for its regulation, 
§335(b)(1) is constitutional.63 
The Time Warner court’s decision has potential far-reaching effects if Congress 
were to try to discourage or eliminate indecent content delivered via DBS. A reading of 
Time Warner in conjunction with Act III or Pacifica seems to indicate that the time 
channeling provisions, if enforced on DBS, would meet constitutional muster. However, 
it is possible that other differences would lead to a different constitutional conclusion. 
These differences include the fact that DBS is not delivered into the home uninvited, 
rather a satellite dish must be installed, and a service must be subscribed to. Another key 
difference is that satellite subscription service may allow for the blocking of individual 
channels which air indecent content. These distinctions might mean that indecency 
regulation of DBS would look more like the regulation of cable under Playboy.
F. Internet Discouraged Content 
 
The internet as one of the newest methods of mass communication and public 
discourse has not escaped Congress’ attempt to restrict the availability of indecent 
content.64 As part of the Telecommunications Act of 1996, Congress passed the 
Communications Decency Act (CDA).65 The CDA led to the adoption of two statutory 
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64 Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844 (1997). 
65 Id. at 857,858. 
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provisions, 47 U.S.C. §§223(a), 223(d). The provisions prohibited the knowing 
transmission or displaying of obscene or indecent content to people under 18 years of 
age.66 The regulations also banned displaying such content in a manner that was available 
to persons under 18 years of age.67 
The constitutionality of Sections 223(a) and 223(d) was challenged in ACLU v. 
Reno. In ACLU, the government asserted the usual rationale for indecency regulation, 
that children will have access to it, and that the medium is pervasive.68 The Supreme 
Court rejected this rationale for several reasons. First, the Court opined that in Pacifica 
indecency regulation of broadcast was partially justified by the fact that a warning at the 
beginning of a broadcast would not protect against the unintentional exposure of children 
just tuning in whereas, on the internet indecent content is often preceded by a warning 
and is not encountered accidentally.69 Second, the Court determined that the internet is 
not as invasive as broadcast is.70 Internet content does not appear on a person’s computer 
without being actively sought.71 Moreover, there are various parental filters available 
which may serve to limit the access of children at the source. Third, the Court held that 
the internet is not scarce.72 The Court found that the low cost easily available ability to 
communicate on the internet had been adopted by over 40 million people and projected 
that by 1999 more than 200 million people would be using the internet.73 Fourth, the 
Court stated that the CDA was too vague.74 This vagueness would not have permitted 
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parents to intentionally expose their children to indecent content online including some 
content which many would judge valuable such as safe sex education. The vagueness of 
the CDA would have led to a suppression of the speech of adults, and as the Court 
explained in Denver, “the government may not reduce the adult population . . . to . . . 
only what is fit for children.75 Upon making these findings, the Supreme Court struck 
down sections 223(a) and 223(d).  
 The unique technological aspects of the internet, its lack of scarcity, its 
susceptibility to parental filters, and the way in which content is delivered has led to an 
environment of very little content based regulation. When looking at possible regulation 
of 3G cellular technology, it will be important to carefully compare the similarities of that 
technology to the internet to determine if content regulation would be plausible.  
 
III. THE 3G CELL PHONE 
 
A. Current Business Models 
 
There are currently three models for the provision of video services over 
wireless networks that may emerge as the dominant business model for 3G services. 
The first of these models allows users to download and view as much video content 
as they want for a monthly subscription fee. Both Verizon and Cingular have adopted 
this model for their initial roll out of 3G services. Cingular offers about 10 “channels” 
of content for this basic subscription fee, and offers HBO and HBO Family for an 
 
75 Id. at 875. 
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additional premium subscription fee. The channels aren’t channels in the traditional 
sense meaning that there is a time sensitive continuing broadcast, but rather each 
channel is a unique content provider, all of their content being available for individual 
download whenever the user desires. Cingular’s programming currently offers local 
weather, news, sports, entertainment, music, and children’s content. Verizon’s V-cast 
service provides users with the option to both download the video content to their 
phone and watch it locally, or to stream the content directly from Verizon. Neither of 
the other two business models are currently being applied to 3G services, but could 
easily become the preferred method of supporting 3G. 
 The first alternative business model is to mimic i-Tunes. Under this model, 3G 
providers would provide the same content, but would charge a small fee for every 
download instead of a monthly subscription fee. Currently, Cingular adopts this 
approach for their music video content only. However, if a Cingular customer does 
not subscribe to the monthly video service and chooses to download video, that 
customer pays by the amount of data transmitted which currently costs approximately 
$10.00 per minute of video content. While both Cingular and Verizon launched 3G 
with a subscription service, the popularity of the i-Tunes’ ala carte model makes it 
possible that 3G services will eventually be delivered in the same fashion. 
 The second alternative model would be to provide advertiser supported video 
content for free to the user. This model, more like broadcast television, hasn’t really 
been tested in the downloadable video context. However, Disney has announced 
plans to begin providing downloadable versions of some of its content for free online. 
These shows will be available the day after they are broadcast. Disney has developed 
20
a technology which will not allow users to fast forward through or skip the 
commercials that it is going to imbed in these shows.76 If this model proves 
successful for Disney, it is possible that the 3G video content providers will also 
consider an advertiser supported format.  
 
B. Where Does 3G Fit Along the Broadcast, DBS, Cable, and Internet 
Spectrum? 
 
As the Court in Red Lion stated “differences in the characteristics of new media 
justify differences in the First Amendment standards applied to them.”77 While the 
various characteristics of 3G probably place it closer to broadcast in the spectrum of First 
Amendment protection than to cable, other characteristics would probably limit the 
allowable scope of regulation.  
 To the extent that the scarcity rationale is still used to justify regulation of content 
and the imposition of public interest obligations, 3G services would probably be found to 
be scarce. There are several ways to look at scarcity. First, 3G services could be found to 
be scarce because there are fewer licenses for advanced wireless service (AWS) than 
there are people willing to provide those services. There are currently only 3 major 
players in the cell phone market, and one of them is eagerly awaiting the forthcoming 
AWS auction without which it will not be able to provide the 3G services that its 
competitors are providing.78 This definition of scarcity is the one employed by the 
 
76 http://abcnews.go.com/Business/Entertainment/story?id=1825619&page=1 (Last viewed 04/29/06). 
77 Red Lion Broadcasting v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 387 (1969). 
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Supreme Court in Red Lion to broadcast and in Time Warner to DBS. Thus, it is likely to 
be the definition of scarcity applied to 3G content providers. The other possible definition 
of scarcity is channel scarcity. Broadcast, for instance, can be considered scarce because 
there are a tightly limited number of speakers that can transmit over the spectrum. DBS, 
on the other hand, has the potential for providing hundreds of channels and therefore has 
much less channel scarcity. If this were the definition of scarcity used, 3G would 
probably not be scarce because the storage capacity for unique video content is almost 
limitless. However, the Time Warner court’s holding that DBS is scarce would probably 
control 3G.      
 An alternative justification for imposing public interest obligations on 3G providers 
was suggested by a dissenting opinion for the denial of rehearing to Time Warner in the 
context of DBS.79 The judge suggested that an implicit cost of the spectrum licenses to 
the bidders for DBS could be the public interest obligations. Similarly, courts may hold 
that public interest obligations should be included as an additional implicit cost to the 
bids for AWS spectrum. If the scarcity rationale is eventually rejected by the courts, this 
licensing rationale may take its place with very little disruption to the actual obligations 
placed on users of the spectrum.  
 While 3G service may be found to be as scarce as broadcast, it would not likely be 
thought to be as pervasive as broadcast. The Court in Pacifica and Act III found that 
broadcast was pervasive because its signal invaded the home whether or not anybody 
wanted it in the home. Therefore, this signal could in some way be considered a nuisance. 
3G signal, on the other hand, is not sent to an individual phone unbidden. The pervasive 
aspect of broadcast, it was determined, made it difficult for parents to filter the content 
 
79 Time Warner Entertainment Co. v. FCC, 105 F.3d 723 (D.C. Cir. 1997).  
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that their children were being exposed to because any headset radio or small personal 
T.V. could receive the free and potentially indecent broadcast signals. A subscription 3G 
system is more like cable where only if the parent is willing to subscribe are their 
children potentially exposed to the content. However, 3G systems are likely to become 
pervasive in another sense. While not necessarily pervasive in the home, many millions 
of Americans, including children, carry cell phones. As 3G penetrates the market more 
deeply, consumers will be confronted not merely with annoying people talking on their 
cell phones in inappropriate locations, but with people watching indecent content in 
public. The watching of indecent content in public is already becoming an issue with 
automobile DVD players.80 Thus, while 3G is less pervasive than broadcast, it is 
substantially more pervasive than cable or DBS. 3G is even somewhat more pervasive 
than the internet, because while many people have wireless access and can view indecent 
content at will over the internet, a substantially greater number of people have cell 
phones.      
 The way in which 3G content would be delivered is more similar to pay per view 
cable or the internet than it is to broadcast. Because 3G content would be delivered on a 
per show basis instead of on a per channel basis, the consumer is likely to know with a 
great deal of specificity the level of violence, profanity, or sexuality that he is about to 
view. As the Court in ACLU found in the context of the internet, indecent 3G content 
would not likely pop-up without the consumer looking for it.81 Moreover, the court in 
ACT III worried that warnings preceding a broadcast would be ineffective for those 
 
80 Kirby, David. “When the Car Beside You Is an XXX Theatre.” New York Times, 10/27/04, Technology 
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81 Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 854 (1997). 
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people just tuning in.82 With a per show business model, 3G consumers would never be 
tuning in to the middle of a program. A warning could therefore always precede the 
content. These factors would make it much easier for a parent to censor their children’s 
viewing of 3G material at the point of receipt than broadcast, basic cable, or DBS  make 
possible. Just as they do for the internet, concerned parents could employ a content filter 
for 3G to prevent their children from having download access to material that they don’t 
want their children to view. This technological capability likely renders content 
regulation at the source unconstitutional. 
 3G technology is likely to be subject to the stringent public interest obligations of 
broadcasters, yet is unlikely to be subject to content regulation at the source. The next 
section will look at what regulations of 3G might look like. 
 
IV REGULATION OF 3G 
 
A. Indecency Regulation 
 
3G, while probably subject to public interest requirements and some indecency 
regulation, would not likely be subject to the time channeling provisions that broadcast 
television is subject to. Broadcasters are in large part subject to the time channeling 
provisions because no effective warning technique has been established.83 3G 
technologies, however, would permit effective screening of programs by the recipient 
without affecting the choices of other adults. The Court in Denver held that in the context 
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24
of cable, adults should not have their options limited to G rated content. Similarly, the 
courts would be unlikely to uphold any regulation which required 3G providers to censor 
indecent content at the source. 
 One argument in favor of time channeling regulations for 3G relates to the 
potential pervasiveness of indecent video content in public. Children when at school or 
even when under their parent’s supervision may be exposed to indecent content 
downloaded onto the phone of a person on the street. Similar instances involving “drive-
by-porn” have been occurring with greater frequency as more people install DVD players 
in their cars.84 By limiting the availability of this content to times when young children 
are likely to be asleep, time channeling provides a uniquely effective method to control 
the content available to children. As argued above, time channeling would likely not meet 
constitutional muster. Moreover, laws punishing the public viewing of indecent material 
can attack this walk-by-porn problem much more narrowly without substantially 
impeding the availability of indecent material for adults. Therefore, rather than regulating 
indecent content at the source like it does for broadcast, and like it attempted for the 
internet, Congress should instead penalize the inappropriate public dissemination of 
indecent content. Just like it would be illegal to project pornography onto the side of 
one’s house, it should be illegal to watch indecent material via a 3G phone in a public 
park.85 
Congress and the FCC might also consider imposing regulations on 3G similar to 
the ones upheld in Playboy. 3G is scarce under the Red Lion definition and is therefore 
probably subject to even greater regulation than cable. The regulations upheld in Playboy 




requiring that cable providers block indecent content upon request would ensure that 
parents would have a means of filtering their children’s video exposure without having to 
eliminate it all together. Such a regulation is particularly important as cell phones are 
being marketed to younger and younger audiences.86 Additionally, many parents will 
want their children to carry a cell phone for emergencies, and some will want their 
children to have access to the educational video content. The Playboy regulation would 
let children access the content geared towards them without being able to access indecent 
content, and without obstructing the access of adults. 
 The Cingular 3G video service already has a parental control function. This 
function, however, has limited usefulness where a rating system hasn’t been developed. 
 
B. Ratings Regulation 
 
The lack of meaningful ratings on 3G content makes it difficult for anyone to know 
exactly what kind of content they are downloading, and makes the parental control 
function that Cingular provides much less valuable. For this reason, Congress should 
consider adopting a technique similar to section 551 of the Telecommunications Act of 
1996, which effectively brow beat the broadcasters into adopting a voluntary ratings 
system. The same technique, if employed against the 3G providers, may not be quite as 
effective. When Congress passed section 551, the broadcasters were aware that Red Lion 
was still good law, and that a Constitutional challenge to section 551 might not be 
successful. There is no precedent stating the level of scrutiny applicable to regulation of 
 
86 http://www.mobiledia.com/news/27261.html (last visited 04/29/06); This is an advertisement for the 
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3G, and the 3G providers might be more willing to challenge the government instead of 
self-regulating. Despite the lack of strong precedent, two additional factors would 
probably cause the 3G providers to self-regulate.  
 First, the 3G providers currently grant access to the Disney channel, Sesame Street, 
HBO Family, and the Cartoon Network. This strong commitment to children’s 
programming indicates that they have an interest in marketing 3G to children. Because 
parents have an interest in filtering the video that their children have access to, parents 
may be unwilling to purchase 3G phones for children if the parental control function isn’t 
made more effective. Thus, there is a market-based incentive for the 3G providers to 
voluntarily adopt a ratings system. 
 Second, one of the reasons that extensive regulation of the content of 3G at the 
source would probably not be permitted is because the technology makes parental control 
at the point of receipt potentially easy. This potential is only realized if there is a ratings 
system. Therefore, a refusal to rate the programming by the 3G providers would make 
time channeling provisions or other harsher regulations more likely to survive a 
constitutional challenge. 
 If the 3G providers did not self-regulate, Congress could probably impose ratings 
regulations on them. 3G technology as both scarce and pervasive falls under the logic of 
Pacifica and Act III. The compelling governmental interest in supporting a parent’s 
oversight would probably be sufficient to justify the minor intrusion on speech that a 
ratings system would impose. A ratings system does not criminalize content, nor does it 
impede the ability of an adult from accessing that content. Therefore, voluntary or not, a 
ratings regime is likely to emerge in the 3G context.  
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C. Public and Governmental Access Regulation 
 
The PEG provisions imposed on cable providers, and the 4% noncommercial 
educational programming floor imposed on DBS providers could similarly be applied to 
3G providers. The PEG provisions were justified as being content neutral by the court in 
Time Warner. Thus, where the government had a compelling interest in encouraging 
diverse speakers, the PEG provisions were allowed. The similar requirement imposed on 
DBS was justified because DBS. like broadcast, was scarce and subject to the public 
interest obligation. Additionally, the court in Time Warner was willing to permit PEG 
requirements where those requirements wouldn’t be overly burdensome on the cable 
provider. The court specifically approved of the provisions if they didn’t take a 
disproportionate amount of the channel capacity from the cable provider.87 In the 3G 
context, the idea of channel capacity is almost non-existent. The “channels” provided by 
a 3G operator are just indexing tools. The amount of content that a 3G provider can offer 
is limited only by its electronic storage capacity. Moreover, one can imagine a system 
evolving in which the 3G operator doesn’t even provide the storage, but merely serves as 
the index and the link to off-site content storage which is paid for by the content 
producers. In such a system, the costs of adding additional content are infinitesimal. The 
money paid by consumers for the content would be split between the 3G operator and the 
content producer. 
 The potential costs of adding PEG content is so low and the potential social benefit 
is so high that Congress should require 3G operators to open their systems to certain 
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content. This content could include public service announcements, safe sex education, 
educational programming, emergency preparedness information, and local government 
announcements. The fact that 3G operators are already providing access to local weather 
and sport information means that such targeted content could likely be provided without 
much additional investment. Furthermore, this content would not only promote diversity 
amongst speakers, but would also address the FCC’s interest in fostering localism. 
 
D. Political Speech Regulation 
 
Congress should impose a regulation similar to 47 U.S.C §315 on 3G operators. 
Just as section 315 can be justified by the public interest obligation of broadcasters, so 
too could a similar regulation affecting 3G operators be justified. It is likely that only 3 
3G operators will arise. It would likely be against the public good if these operators all 
decided to only offer the content of one particular political party. Moreover, because the 
costs of adding additional content to 3G networks will be so low, forcing 3G operators to 
allow all bona fide Federal candidates several minutes worth of content will not infringe 
upon the speech of the 3G operators. Unlike in the newspaper context where the printing 
of one story means that another story will likely not be printed, 3G operators will not lose 
any ability to further their own speech if required to link to and index opposing political 
candidates.88 Furthermore, the ability of consumers in the increasingly fast paced modern 
world to assimilate important political messages is tightly constrained. Creating a means 
for these people to access diverse opposing political messages in a quick, portable format 
is an important social benefit, and if challenged in court would likely be found to 
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represent a compelling government interest. Since the interest is compelling and the cost 
to the 3G operators is so low, the courts would likely uphold the regulation.  
 During the 2004 presidential election, i-Tunes made various candidate speeches 
available online for free. 3G operators who have been granted the right to use the 
valuable AWS spectrum should similarly support the democratic process.   
 
E. Children’s Educational Programming 
 
Congress should not yet act to impose children’s educational programming 
requirements on 3G operators. The CTA, which imposes a children’s educational 
programming requirement on broadcasters, is justified because that programming 
provides a valuable public benefit, and because market failures prevent the socially 
optimal amount of children’s programming from being aired. Thus, the broadcaster’s 
public interest obligation compels them to fill that programming void. However, in the 
3G context, no market failure exists. As long as the CTA is in effect and children’s 
programming is being made for broadcast or other mediums, that programming can be 
inexpensively offered through 3G. The low cost of adding additional content to the 3G 
index means that even shows with a low potential for profit can be offered. The large 
proportion of children’s programming relative to other programming offered by Cingular 
video and by Verizon V-cast is empirical evidence that in the 3G context the market 
failure does not exist. 
 While congress should not impose separate children’s educational programming 
regulations on 3G operators, it should continue to impose those obligations on 
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broadcasters to ensure that the programming is produced. Moreover, if it is later 
determined that the 3G operators are not providing a sufficient supply of children’s 
educational programming, the public interest obligations probably provide a sufficient 




The emergence of 3G technology poses a unique challenge to regulators as 
characteristics of 3G are similar to many other technologies both new and old. Regulators 
should look back at the prior technologies when developing the proper means to regulate 
3G. This regulation must address indecency, a ratings system, government and local 
access, children’s programming, and political access. The regulatory approach as 
suggested by this paper would serve to support parental choice without limiting the 
availability of content for adults. Moreover, the suggested regulatory approach would 
leave 3G free to develop into the powerful tool that it has the potential to become. 
 
